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RegionalCityand NetworkCity:
Portlandand Seattlein the
TwentiethCentury
CARL ABBOTT

-En

conomic and social interactions in the United States have undergone a massive expansion of scale since the mid-nineteenth century. The change is apparent in the size and scope of business enterprise, government operations, and organized social movements. As
Kenneth Boulding pointed out nearly forty years ago, the result has been
an "organizational revolution." The relatively isolated and self-contained
"island communities" described by Robert Wiebe have been encompassed
by a web of national institutions, obligations, and interactions. One result
has been the intensification of extra local ties and connections at the expense of local relationships.'
Scholars interested in the elaboration of organization and the expansion of scale have given particular attention to the industrial transformation of the United States between 1870 and 1920. Understanding modernization as the interactive development of mass production, industrial
cities, and bureaucracy, these scholars help us understand both the rise of
the central state and the cultural process of nation-building. In detail,
Carl Abbott is professor of urban studies and planning at Portland State University.
1 In Kenneth
Boulding, The OrganizationalRevolution(New York, 1952), the author explored the social and cultural consequences of the expansion of institutional scale since the
early twentieth century. Robert Wiebe made the increasing scale and integration of American institutions the central theme for interpreting the transition from nineteenth to twentieth century in Robert H. Wiebe, The Searchfor Order,1877-1920 (New York, 1967) and restated the same interpretation for a longer time span in Robert H. Wiebe, TheSegmentedSociety (New York, 1975). Organizational change as a synthesizing principle for United States history has been proposed in Louis Galambos, "The Emerging Organizational Synthesis in
Modern American History," Business History Review 44 (Autumn 1970): 279-90; in Louis
Galambos, "Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization: Central Themes of the
Organizational Synthesis," BusinessHistoryReview57 (Winter 1983): 471-93; and Louis Galambos, Americaat MiddleAge:A New Historyof the UnitedStatesin the TwentiethCentury(New York,
1982). The "organizational synthesis" has been examined by Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., 'The
Organizational Interpretation of American History: A New Synthesis,"Prospects4 (1979): 61129; and Robert D. Cuff, "American Historians and the 'Organizational Factor,'" CanadianReview of AmericanStudies4 (Spring 1973): 19-31. This approach can be viewed as a refinement
or specification of modernization theory, which was developed by Emile Durkheim, Georg
Simmel, Max Weber, and others to explain the broad outlines of societal change.
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many of their studies deal with the emergence of national organizations,
institutions, and fields of action: corporations, universities, federal agencies, labor unions, professions, industrial sectors, and policy arenas.2 For
the twentieth century, mainstream social science has tended to assume the
continuing expansion of social scale and to explore the erosion of local
and regional affiliations.3
The expanding scale of economic activity, in contrast, raises the question of differentiation as well as homogenization. In the twentieth century,
further transitions of economic organization have depended upon the
ability of corporations to use new technologies of distribution and control
to manage multilocational enterprises. The results can be viewed as a redefinition of specialization within increasingly complex national and
global systems.4 This redefinition opens the basic historical question of
differential impacts on individual communities. Local heritage, local character, and conscious local choices have all mediated the effects of economic scale-change.
Specifically, American cities have responded differently to opportunities created by the rise of an interconnected world economy. This essay examines the range of such responses by analyzing the experiences of twentieth-century Portland and Seattle. Separated by 175 miles of highway or
rail line, the cities have similar early histories, analogous economic bases,
and parallel demographic profiles, and have long competed against each
other for regional dominance. Nevertheless, they have diverged in their
2 Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr., The VisibleHand: The ManagerialRevolutionin AmericanBusiness (New York, 1977); Laurence R. Veysey, The Emergenceof the AmericanUniversity(Chicago,
1965); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New AmericanState:TheExpansionof National AdministrativeCapacities,1877-1920 (New York, 1982); Thomas L. Haskell, TheEmergenceofProfessional
Crisisof Authority
SocialScience:TheAmericanSocialScienceAssociationand theNineteenth-Century
The MiddleClassand the
(Urbana, IL, 1977); BurtonJ. Bledstein, The Cultureof Professionalism:
Developmentof HigherEducationin America(New York, 1976); Olivier Zunz, MakingAmericaCorporate,1870-1920 (Chicago, 1990).
3 Robert A. Nisbet, The Quest
for Community(New York, 1953); Maurice R. Stein, The
An
of AmericanStudies(Princeton, 1960); Arthur J. Vidich
Interpretation
Community:
Eclipseof
and Joseph Bensman, Small Town in Mass Society:Class,Powerand Religionin a Rural Community (Princeton, 1968); Roland L. Warren, The Communityin America(Chicago, 1963); and
Melvin Webber, "Order in Diversity:Community without Propinquity," in Citiesand Space,ed.
Lowdon Wingo (Baltimore, 1963), 23-54. For a critique and summary see Albert Hunter,
UrbanLife,ed.
"Persistence of Local Sentiments in Mass Society," in Handbookof Contemporary
David Street (San Francisco, 1978), 133-62.
4John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston, 1971); Paul Kantor with
Stephen David, TheDependentCity:The ChangingPoliticalEconomyof UrbanAmerica(Glenview,
IL, 1988), 164-70; John Mollenkopf, The ContestedCity (Princeton, 1983); Michael Storper,
'Toward a Structural Theory of Industrial Location," in John Rees, Geoffrey J. D. Hewings,
and Howard A. Stafford, eds., IndustrialLocationand RegionalSystems(New York, 1981), 1741;
Thomas Stanback and Thierry Noyelle, The EconomicTransformationof AmericanCities (Totowa, NJ, 1983); Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, eds., Production,Work,Territory:Thegeographicalanatomyof industrialcapitalism(Boston, 1986).
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connections with the changing national and world economy. I use quantitative measures to define contrasting regional and network orientations
that reflect the relative localization or nationalization of community economic life. Between 1900 and 1950, Seattle and Portland were both regional capitals. Since the 1950s, however, Seattle has assumed functions
that reach beyond the Pacific Northwest for inputs and markets. While
Portland has pursued its traditional role, and even gained ground as a regional metropolis, Seattle has grown into a network city involved in the
long-distance transfer of goods, services, and ideas.
The character of civic enterprise shapes this divergence. Faced with
the same economic environment between 1955 and 1970, Portland responded with hesitancy, while Seattle acted with greater flexibility and initiative. Comparisons of parallel public decisions in the two cities allow us
to weigh the effects of government institutions and political values on
growth. For the crucial years around 1960, Seattle's tendency to make network-oriented choices can best be explained by studying the decision-making styles grounded in each city's political culture.5
A century ago, Portland and Seattle had an equal partnership in the
Pacific Northwest. In the mercantile model of urban growth suggested by
Richard Wade and elaborated by James Vance, they were points of entry
for capital and labor in a developing frontier.6 Portland's eight-year head
start as an American settlement-1843 versus 1851-gave it an initial edge
in trade with gold-rush California, but both cities soon developed as importers or suppliers of manufactured goods and processed foods and as
exporters of raw materials within a commercial and financial system dominated by San Francisco.7 By the time transcontinental railroads reached
the Northwest, Portland's jump on Seattle was down to the single year between 1883 and 1884, although Seattleites waited until the early 1890s for
fully competitive service.
5The distinction between structural and cultural determinants of community decisionmaking follows Michael Aiken and Robert R. Alford, "Comparative Urban Research and
Community Decision-Making," in Willis D. Hawley and Frederick M. Wirt, eds., TheSearchfor
CommunityPower,2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1974), 274, andJ. Rogers Hollingsworth and
Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, Dimensionsin UrbanHistory:Historicaland Social SciencePerspectives
on Middle-SizeAmericanCities(Madison, 1979), 10-12.
6 Richard C. Wade, The UrbanFrontier:TheRise Western
Cities,1790-1830 (Cambridge,
of
MA, 1959); James E. Vance, Jr., TheMerchant'sWorld:TheGeography
of Wholesaling(Englewood
Cliffs, NJ, 1970). Nineteenth-century Portland and Seattle can also be viewed as gateway
cities in the sense developed in William Cronon, Nature'sMetropolis:Chicagoand the GreatWest
(New York, 1991).
7 Rodman Paul, Mining Frontiersof the Far West, 1848-1890 (New York, 1963); D. W.
Meinig, "American Wests: Preface to a Geographical Interpretation," Annals of theAssociation
62 (June 1972): 164; E. Kimbark MacColl with Harry H. Stein, Merof AmericanGeographers
chants,Moneyand Power:ThePortlandEstablishment,1843-1913 (Portland, 1988), 4-41; Norbert
MacDonald, Distant Neighbors:A ComparativeHistoryof Seattle& Vancouver(Lincoln, 1987), 1214.
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In the common version of the history of the Northwest, the Klondike
gold rush of 1897 permanently upset the commercial balance between
cities. Through a combination of boosterism, luck, and previous trading
connections, Seattle made itself the entrepot for the Far North. Portland
and other West Coast cities had equal ambitions, but publicist Erastus
Brainerd and the Seattle Chamber of Commerce identified Seattle with
Alaska in the public mind.8 Captured initially in the flush times, the story
goes, Alaska business stayed in the pocket of Seattle merchants, bankers,
and boat builders, and triggered an inevitable process of economic agglomeration that pushed Seattle's population past Portland by 1910 and
kept it in the lead.9 As early as 1921, historians such as Ezra Meeker perceived that "without Alaska Washington would not now have attained the
commanding development that is her pride." Murray Morgan said it even
more directly: "In Seattle, gold spurred growth, and growth battened on
growth."10
In both thematic and chronological coverage, the story, as outlined,
is typical of historical explanations of the relative fortunes of American
cities. It treats differential urban growth as the product of an intraregional
competition that was over by the twentieth century. On closer examination, however, the Portland-Seattle case does not match the standard
model as closely as supposed. The recent experience of the two cities
demonstrates the continued volatility of urban fortunes within a regional
context, as new sources and avenues of growth have emerged with the expanding scale of economic activity. The case invites an alternative explanation for differential urban growth that emphasizes national and international connections, in addition to regional roles. The history of the two
cities reconfirms the importance of specific events and choices, but the
point of divergence lies sixty years closer to the present than often
thought. In addition, many of the crucial decisions have involved the public, rather than the private, sector.
8 Jeannette Paddock
Nichols, "Advertising and the Klondike," WashingtonHistorical
Quarterly13 (January 1922): 20-26; Norbert MacDonald, "Seattle, Vancouver, and the
Klondike," Canadian Historical Review49 (September 1968): 23446; Murray Morgan, Skid
Road:An InformalPortraitof Seattle,rev. ed. (Sausalito, CA, 1971), 156-63.
9 WPA Writers' Program, Washington:A Guideto theEvergreenState(Tacoma, 1941), 21820; Howard H. Martin, "Urban Patterns of Western Washington," in Otis W. Freeman and
Howard H. Martin, eds., ThePacific Northwest:An OverallAppreciation(New York, 1954), 45962; EdwinJ. Cohn,Jr., Industryin thePacificNorthwestand theLocationTheory(New York, 1954),
26; Constance McLaughlin Green, AmericanCitiesin the Growthof theNation(New York, 1965),
177-79; Gordon B. Dodds, TheAmericanNorthwest(Arlington Heights, IL, 1986), 134-35; and
Carlos A. Schwantes, ThePacificNorthwest:An Interpretive
History(Lincoln, 1989), 195-98.
10Ezra Meeker, SeventyYearsof Progressin Washington(Seattle, 1921), 328; Murray Morgan, Puget'sSound:A NarrativeofEarly Tacomaand theSouthernSound (Seattle, 1979), 301. Also
see the treatment of Portland in Roger Sale, SeattlePast to Present(Seattle, 1976), 50-93, and
MacDonald, Distant Neighbors,58, 70.
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The "Alaskathesis" of Seattle's ascendancy fits within the common
historical model of interurban competition in the nineteenth-century
United States. Baltimore and Philadelphia, St. Louis and Chicago, and
scores of other urban rivals provide comparable stories in which active
and foresightful entrepreneurs in one city capitalized on commercial opportunities potentially available to both. In turn, the trade of the newly acquired hinterland supported further growth of the successful city and increased its competitive advantage in future rivalries. The model is especially apt for the era of continental expansion, when the progress of settlement involved the allocation of newly opened frontiers among new commercial centers." Indeed, historical studies of urban rivalries and urban
imperialism mirror the nineteenth-century understanding of urban
growth as the product of territorial control of resources and trade.'2
A spatially-rooted explanation of differential urban growth also
matches the basic assumptions of central place theory. One of the key
models in modern quantitative geography, central place theory, was developed in Germany in the 1930s, introduced in the United States in the
1940s, and tested against American evidence in the 1950s and 1960s. The
theory argues that there is a correspondence between the size of a city, the
variety of functions it performs for a surrounding hinterland, and the size
or purchasing power of that hinterland. The wider a city's spatial reach,
the broader its range of businesses and the larger its population. A city
that captures a new customer base (such as Alaska) or enjoys a rapidly developing hinterland (such as the Columbia Plateau) positions itself for
economic diversification and growth in the level of economic activity. The
final result in a developing region is a nested hierarchy of towns and hinterlands that builds successively from crossroads stores through small
towns to comprehensive regional centers.13
The structured propositions of central place theory recognize the resources and demands of a city's hinterland as the essential engine of that
1 For an introduction to the literature on inter-urban
competition and urban imperialism, see Charles N. Glaab, "Historical Perspective on Urban Development Schemes," in Social Scienceand the City,ed. Leo F. Schnore (New York, 1968), 197-219.
12
Wade, UrbanFrontier,322-36; Carl Abbott, Boostersand Businessmen:PopularEconomic
Thoughtand UrbanGrowthin theAntebellumMiddle West(Westport, CT, 1981), 198-208; Charles
N. Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, A Historyof UrbanAmerica,2d ed. (New York, 1976), 59-65;
J. Christopher Schnell and Katherine B. Clinton, "The New West: Themes in Nineteenth
Century Urban Promotion," Bulletinof theMissouriHistoricalSociety30 (January 1974): 75-88.
13 Walter
Christaller, CentralPlaces in SouthernGermany(Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1966);
August L6sch, TheEconomicsof Location (New Haven, 1954); Edward Ullman, "A Theory of
Location for Cities," AmericanJournalof Sociology46 (May 1941): 835-64; BrianJ. L.
Berry and
Allan Pred, CentralPlace Studies:A Bibliographyof Theoryand Applications
(Philadelphia, 1965);
Brian J. L. Berry, The Geographyof MarketCentersand RetailDistribution(Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1967).
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city's growth.'4 In historical terms, the process of interurban competition
has determined relative positions in the hierarchy of central places. For
newly settled frontiers such as the Pacific Northwest, where each ambitious town started nearly equally, it requires historical analysis to understand how Seattle eclipsed Everett, or how Portland squeezed out Oregon
City. This regional approach to urban growth has been particularly congenial to American urban historians because it emphasizes local decisions
and sources of information, and is compatible with practicable case studies. It also ties the subfield of urban history to the wide historical interest
in the expansion of the continental resource frontier.15
An alternative model that emphasizes extra-regional networks as key
determinants of urban growth may offer greater relevance to the processes of urban development in the twentieth century, which has been
marked by basic changes in the sectoral composition and spatial patterns
of economic activity. Several historians who have taken on topics with
broad spatial and temporal sweep have described dual urban systems in
which a set of regionally based cities co-exists with a second set of cities oriented to national or transnational networks. Studying late imperial China,
G. William Skinner found that one hierarchy of towns and cities served regional trading needs with few connections outside their local hinterlands.
The hierarchy developed from the bottom up with the expansion of local
and provincial commerce in accord with the assumptions of central place
theory. A second hierarchy of administrative centers, in contrast, was created from the top down by imperial agents and functioned as a single network of centers for control and information transmission.'6 Edward W.
Fox divided premodern France into two sub-areas and urban systems
based on different patterns of exchange. Central and interior France was a
territorial society organized around local trade between provincial cities
and regional agricultural hinterlands. The commercial society of the west14 Although they start with large metropolitan centers rather than small towns, functional classifications of American cities have shared an interest in the regional sources of
urban growth. Otis Dudley Duncan et al., Metropolisand Region(Baltimore, 1960) described a
national urban hierarchy with a handful of truly national cities and a second tier of eight "regional metropolises" including Portland and Seattle. This second group is characterized by
its special dependence on commercial and financial services performed for regional hinterlands. More recently, Thomas Stanback and Thierry Noyelle, in TheEconomicTransformation
of American Cities, identified nineteen "regional diversified advanced service centers" that
again include Seattle and Portland. The economies of such cities are dominated by regionally oriented transporation, utility, retail, banking, and wholesaling services.
15 Carl
Abbott, "Frontiers and Sections: Cities and Regions in American Growth," in
Howard Gillette, Jr. and Zane L. Miller, eds., American Urbanism:A HistoriographicReview
(Westport, CT, 1987), 271-90.
16 G. William
Skinner, "Urban Development in Late Imperial China" and "Cities and
the Hierarchy of Local Systems,"both in The Cityin Late ImperialChina, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford, 1977), 3-27, 275-352.

299

CARLABBOTT

1992

ern coast, in contrast, was dominated by Atlantic seaports tied more
closely to interregional and international flows of goods than to their own
backcountry. Bordeaux and Nantes co-existed with interior cities in the
same political unit, but also participated in a network of trading cities that
extended from Amsterdam and London to Lisbon, Barcelona, and
Naples.17

In The Making of Urban Europe, Lynn Lees and Paul Hohenberg

elabo-

rated Fox's idea of regional and commercial systems as a major explanatory concept. They argued that western European urbanization produced
parallel systems that coexisted in time and often in space. Cities in the
central place system were rooted in a close relationship with their agricultural environs, expressed indigenous or provincial culture, and tied the locality to the state through a defined hierarchy of towns and cities. Network
cities took their life from long-distance commerce and served as "centers,
nodes, junctions,

outposts, and relays" within complex

sets of economic

and social linkages that crossed political borders. They transmitted values
and ideas from one culture to the next. Lees and Hohenberg have presented the two systems not as exclusive categories but as heuristic concepts
that focus attention on one or the other aspects of urban growth. Major
cities, indeed, could fill roles simultaneously in both regional and network
systems.18

Historians of United States cities have sporadically stressed the importance of extraregional connections. In his classic study, TheRise of New
YorkPort, Robert G. Albion argued that New York's early roles in coastal
shipping, trans-Atlantic trade, and wholesaling were more important than
its capture of a regional hinterland. For the twentieth century, Roger
Lotchin and Gerald Nash have focused attention on the ways in which federal spending and investment in federal facilities functioned as sources of
rapid growth in western cities. Other historians of sunbelt cities have also
begun to examine international connections during the postwar
decades.19

Extra-regional sources of urban growth have received theoretical attention in the social sciences. Geographer Allan Pred has offered empirical
17Edward W. Fox,
Historyin Geographic
Perspective:The OtherFrance(New York, 1971).
18Paul
Hohenberg and Lynn H. Lees, The Making of UrbanEurope, 1000-1950 (Cambridge, MA, 1985). Also see Eugene Genovese and Leonard Hochberg, eds., GeographicPerspectivesin History(London, 1989).
19Robert Greenhalgh Albion, The Rise of New YorkPort: 1815-1860 (New York, 1939);
Roger W. Lotchin, FortressCalifornia, 1910-1961: From Warfareto Welfare(New York, 1992);
Gerald D. Nash, TheAmericanWestTransformed:TheImpactof theSecondWorldWar(Bloomington, 1985); Spencer C. Olin, "Globalization and the Politics of Locality: Orange County, California in the Cold War Era," WesternHistoricalQuarterly22 (May 1991): 143-62; Carl Abbott,
"International Cities in the Dual Systems Model: The Transformations of Los Angeles and
No. 18 (Leicester, ENG, 1991).
Washington," UrbanHistoryYearbook
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support for a model of urban growth that parallels the historical idea of
the dual system, arguing that central place theory is far too limited for understanding the wide ranging connections of modern cities. In Pred's
"asymmetric"model, a city's transactions with its regional hinterland are
likely to be less important for its future than its unpredictable and idiosyncratic set of extra-regional connections. To support his argument, he
points to the large proportion of jobs in every major city now controlled
by multi-locational businesses and government organizations. A detailed,
empirical description of the corporate control patterns of Seattle, Portland, and four other western cities as of 1974-1975 shows that extra-regional ties equal or outweigh those within traditional hinterlands.20
Pred's data are often cited by an emerging school of urban analysis
that emphasizes a city's role in the global economy as the prime determinant of local economic change. In particular, fundamental changes in the
world economic system during the 1970s have created a "new international division of labor" that has established a new and controlling context
for urban growth programs.21In specific applications, Joe Feagin has described twentieth-century Houston as being tied to international markets
and multinational corporations through decisions of Detroit auto executives, congressional committees, and foreign oil producers. Edward Soja
and his co-workers have detailed the transition of Los Angeles from a regionally-based metropolis, oriented to domestic markets, to "aglobal capitalist city of major proportions" that participates fully in the finance and
production networks of the Pacific Rim.22
These alternative conceptions of regional and network cities help to
define specific questions about the comparative development of twentieth
century Seattle and Portland. Both cities entered the century having developed after two generations into regional centers for Puget Sound and the
Columbia Basin. The common understanding of Northwest history suggests that both have retained their regional roles, but that Seattle has
in AdvancedEconomies(New York, 1977), 98-165.
Pred, City-Systems
Massey, The SpatialDivision of Labor(London, 1984); David Harvey, The Urbanizationof Capital (Baltimore, 1985); Joe R. Feagin and Michael Peter Smith, "Cities and
the New International Division of Labor," in The CapitalistCity,ed.Joe R. Feagin and Michael
Peter Smith (Oxford, ENG, 1987), 3-36;Jeffrey Henderson and Manuel Castells, eds., Global
Restructuringand TerritorialDevelopment(London, 1987); John R. Logan and Harvey L.
Molotch, UrbanFortunes:ThePoliticalEconomyof Place (Berkeley, 1987); Mark Gottdiener and
Joe R. Feagin, 'The Paradigm Shift in Urban Sociology," UrbanAffairs Quarterly24 (December 1988): 163-87; Robert A. Beauregard, ed., EconomicRestructuringand Political Response
(Newbury Park, CA, 1989).
22
Joe R. Feagin, 'The Global Context of Metropolitan Growth: Houston and the Oil
Industry," AmericanJournal of Sociology90 (May 1985): 1204-30; and Joe R. Feagin, FreeEnterpriseCity:Houston in Political-Economic
Perspective(New Brunswick, NJ, 1988); Edward Soja, Rebecca Morales, and Goetz Wolff, "Urban Restructuring: An Analysis of Social and Spatial
59 (April 1983): 195-230.
Change in Los Angeles," EconomicGeography
20 Allan

21 Doreen
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made a better job of it, edging further ahead until it has left Portland behind. The suggestion that Seattle may have grown by gaining new trans-regional network functions, however, provides an alternative framework for
understanding change within an urban system. A variety of accessible
quantitative data allow a structured evaluation of Seattle's relative success.
In 1900, the Twelfth Census counted 9,555 more Portlanders than
Seattleites. Eighty years later, Seattle's margin over Portland was either
365,000 (using Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas [SMSA]) or
795,000 (using Consolidated Metropolitan Areas). For the years between,
the changing population ratio provides a standardized measure that directly reflects the relative growth of the two cities (see Table 1; tables
begin on p. 320). The first decade of the twentieth century shows the expected surge for Seattle, with carry-overinto the 1910s. Between 1920 and
1950, however, the two cities grew at the same pace. Not until the 1950s
and 1960s did Seattle began again to outpace Portland. The pattern since
1970 depends on the chosen definition for the Seattle and Portland
metropolitan areas. Use of Consolidated Metropolitan Areas, which adds
Tacoma to Seattle, shows Portland losing more ground after 1970. Comparison of growth within 1960 SMSAboundaries, however, shows relatively
slower growth for Seattle in the 1970s, followed by recovery in the 1980s.
This aggregate population comparison directs the search for critical
turning points in the Seattle-Portland rivalry to the 1950s and 1960s. Information on the structure of the two metropolitan economies supports
the same conclusion by showing significant changes in the sources of economic growth for Seattle, but not for Portland, after 1950.
Apart from the Alaskan bonanza, Seattle and Portland retained more
structural similarities than differences between 1900 and 1920. Both benefited from the shift of the American timber industry to the Northwest and
from an agricultural boom in the Columbia Basin that was triggered by
new railroad lines, private and public irrigation projects, stock raising,
and dryfarming.23Both cities' bankers controlled roughly equal amounts
of capital when new federal reserve banks were located in 1913.24 Both

23 D. W.
Meinig, The Great ColumbiaPlain: A Historical Geography,1805-1910 (Seattle,
1968); John Fahey, The Inland Empire:Unfolding Years,1879-1929 (Seattle, 1986); Thomas
R.Cox, Mills and Markets:A Historyof thePacific CoastLumberIndustryto 1900 (Seattle, 1974);
Robert E. Ficken, The ForestedLand: A History of Lumberingin WesternWashington(Seattle,
1987); James O. Oliphant, On the CattleRanges of the OregonCountry(Seattle, 1968); and
Dodds, AmericanNorthwest,137-48.
24 In
1913, national banks in Seattle had a capital stock surplus of $5,560,000 and in
Portland, $6,675,000. See Richard Franklin Bensel, Sectionalismand AmericanPoliticalDevelopment, 1880-1980 (Madison, WI, 1984), 426-31. Citing a different measure, Dorothy O. Johansen and Charles M. Gates, Empireof the Columbia:A Historyof the Pacific Northwest(New
York, 1957), 435, report that national banking resources in 1909 totaled $38 million for
Seattle and $32 million for Portland.
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downtowns experienced building booms to provide office space for commercial, financial, and professional service sectors. Successful international expositions in 1905 (Portland's Lewis and Clark Centennial Exposition and Oriental Fair) and 1909 (Seattle's Alaska-Yukon-PacificExposition) symbolized the cities' arrivals as mature communities that could
command the respectful attention of easterners.25
Given the similar roles of the two cities, Seattle's more rapid growth
tied directly to the development of its hinterland. For comparative analysis, Portland's primary hinterland is defined as Oregon and three adjacent
counties in southwestern Washington, with southwestern Idaho as its secondary hinterland. Seattle's primary hinterland is the remainder of Washington, while Alaska, the Idaho panhandle, and western Montana are its
secondary hinterland.26As an estimate of effective market size, population
is weighted at 1.0 in the primary hinterlands and at 0.5 in the secondary
hinterlands, where other cities competed for market share (see Table 2).
Between 1900 and 1920, Seattle's trading region grew more rapidly than
Portland's, reflecting the development of Alaska and the Columbia
Plateau and the climax of activity in the northern Rocky Mountain mining
region. The completion of additional transcontinental railroads in 1893
and 1909 also helped Seattle cut into Portland's business in eastern Washington. The Seattle:Portland population ratio increased by 34 percent
over the two decades while the comparable hinterland ratio increased by
20 percent (see Table 2, Column 1). If the populations of the two cities
themselves are excluded from the hinterland totals, the ratio increased by
25 percent (see Table 2, Column 2).

Carl Abbott, Portland:Planning, Politics and Growthin a TwentiethCenturyCity (Lincoln, 1983), 33-70; George Frykman, 'The Alaska-Yukon-PacificExposition, 1909," Pacific
NorthwestQuarterly53 (July 1962): 89-99; Sale, Seattle,78-86, 92.
26 Portland's
primary hinterland is defined as Oregon plus Clark, Cowlitz, and Skamania counties, Washington. Seattle's primary hinterland is defined as the remainder of Washington. Portland's secondary hinterland is Ada, Adams, Boise, Camas, Canyon, Elmore,
Gem, Gooding, Owyhee, Payette, Twin Falls, and Washington counties, Idaho. Seattle's secondary hinterland is Alaska; Benewah, Bonner, Boundary, Clearwater, Idaho, Kootenai,
Latah, Lewis, Nez Perce, and Shoshone counties, Idaho; and Beaverhead, Broadwater, Cascade, Deer Lodge, Flathead, Gallatin, Glacier, Granite, Lewis and Clark, Lincoln, Madison,
Meagher, Mineral, Missoula, Park, Pondera, Powell, Ravalli, Sanders, Silver Bow, Teton, and
Toole counties, Montana. The allocation of these territories is based on patterns of rail and
water transportation, retail trade, and newspaper circulation. Several studies are useful for
defining the outer limits where the Seattle and Portland hinterlands have shaded into those
of San Francisco, Salt Lake City, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. These include John R. Borchert,
America'sNorthernHeartland (Minneapolis, 1987); Mildred Hartsough, The Twin Cities as a
MetropolitanMarket(Minneapolis, 1925); Chauncy Dennison Harris, Salt Lake City:A Regional
Capital (Chicago, 1940); D. W. Meinig, "The Mormon Culture Region: Strategies and Patterns in the Geography of the American West,"Annals of theAssociationofAmercan Geographers
55 (1965): 191-220; and A. Philip Andrus et al., Seattle(Cambridge, MA, 1976), 1-3.
25
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There was little change in the standing of the two cities between 1920
and 1950. Portland drew closer to Seattle in population in the 1920s, held
its gains in the 1930s, and slipped only as far as its relative position of 1920
during the turbulent 1940s. Data on industrial structure support the picture of regional stability. Regionally-based manufacturing makes direct
and essential use of regional resources and raw materials.27Although the
basis for data compilation changed in 1930 and again in 1940, the
Seattle:Portland ratios in Table 3 suggest that such industries accounted
for a stable proportion of total employment in each city from 1920 to
1940. War production jobs and wartime growth were also comparable.28As
late as the 1950s, outside observers thought that the two cities competed
on an equal basis for the trade of the Pacific Northwest, with Portland
gaining shipping and wholesaling at the expense of Seattle, and Seattle
building a more diversified manufacturing base.29
Another indicator of regional relationships is the extent to which
economic activity and population concentrate in a single "primate"city.
High concentration may reflect both the absence of strong secondary
cities, as in lesser developed nations, and the "overdevelopment" of a
dominant city through participation in trading systems or other exchange
networks external to its regional hinterland, as with medieval Venice or
modern Miami.30Table 4 summarizes the standard Ginsburg Index of
27
Regionally oriented manufacturing industries include lumber and wood products,
paper and related products, foodstuffs, textile mills, furniture and related products, leather
products, and primary metals. Metals are included because of the importance of local iron
ore for small iron producing industries at the turn of the century and because of the role of
regionally generated hydro-electric power as the essential resource input for aluminum production. The data were drawn from: TwelthCensusof the UnitedStates,Vol. 8: Manufactures,Pt.
2: Statesand Territoriesand SpecialReports:Occupations(Washington, DC); ThirteenthCensusof
the United States, Vol. 9: Manufactures:Reportsby States (Washington, DC); FourteenthCensusof
the United States, Vol. 4: Population: Occupationsand Vol. 9: Manufactures:Reportsfor States
(Washington, DC); FifteenthCensusof the UnitedStates, Vol. 4: Occupationsby States (Washington, DC); SixteenthCensus of the United States: Characteristicsof the Population, (Washington,
DC), Table 51; SeventeenthCensusof the UnitedStates:Characteristics
of thePopulation (Washington, DC), Table 79; EighteenthCensusof the UnitedStates:Characteristics
of thePopulation(Washington, DC), Table 12; NineteenthCensus of the United States: Characteristicsof the Population
(Washington, DC), Table 184; TwentiethCensusof the UnitedStates:DetailedPopulation Characteristics(Washington, DC), Table 228.
28 Carl Abbott,
"Planning for the Home Front in Seattle and Portland, 1940-45," in The
MartialMetropolis,ed. Roger Lotchin (New York, 1984), 163-89.
29John Gunther, Inside U.S.A.
(New York, 1947), 92; and Neil Morgan, WestwardTilt:
TheAmericanWestToday(New York, 1963), 210-12.
30 Brian
J. L. Berry, "CitySize Distribution and Economic Development," EconomicDevelopmentand CulturalChange9 (July1961): 573-87; Clyde Browning, "Primate Cities and Related Concepts," in Urban Systemsand EconomicDevelopment,ed. F. R. Pitts (Eugene, OR,
1962); BrianJ. L. Berry and Frank E. Horton, GeographicPerspectiveson UrbanSystems:WithIntegratedReadings(Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1970), 64-93; Michael Timberlake, ed., Urbanizationin
the World-Economy
(Orlando, FL, 1985).
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urban primacy, calculated by dividing the population of a region's largest
city by the combined population of its four largest cities. An index that approaches 1.0 indicates that the largest city far overshadows its nearest rivals. An index of .50 or less shows the presence of substantial secondary
cities, a pattern that is characteristic of developed economies.31
The primacy indices for Portland and Seattle are striking for their stability between 1920 and 1950. Just as neither metropolis gained or lost
population relative to the other, so neither gained nor lost significantly,
relative to the secondary cities in its hinterland. Seattle's lower index reflects the size of its hinterland cities of Tacoma, Spokane, and Butte,
which outranked Boise, Eugene, and Salem until after World War II. By
implication, Seattle's well-developed hinterland offered a wide range of
opportunities for growth as a regional city.
Portland's strong competitive showing in the 1920s and 1930s was
tied to continued growth in its farming hinterland in Oregon and southern Idaho. In contrast, the mining regions of Alaska, northern Idaho, and
Montana were stagnating (see Table 2). The Seattle:Portland ratios of hinterland population declined by 13 to 17 percent between 1920 and 1940,
showing the more rapid growth of Portland's trading zone. Data available
since 1930 allow the population totals to be weighted by state per capita
personal income, which gives a closer approximation of hinterland purchasing power. The weighting alters the individual ratios but not the trend
(see Table 2, Columns 34).
After a century of relatively stable competition, the regional sources
of Seattle's advantage over Portland began to erode in the 1950s. If anything, Portland, rather than Seattle, reaped the greatest benefit from
regional development and regionally-oriented activities. Even though
Seattle's population margin over Portland grew from 20 percent in 1950
to 41 percent in 1970, the two hinterlands grew at essentially the same
pace (Table 2). Seattle's increasing primacy after 1950 suggests that it has
become less dependent on regional connections. Portland's decreasing
primacy, in contrast, is caused by the more rapid development of its hinterland with resulting opportunities for regional trade and services.
Trends in specific industrial sectors support the conclusion that Portland, rather than Seattle, benefited most from regional functions after
1950. Before World War II, for example, Seattle's wholesale business was
half again as great as Portland's. Seattle's lead shrank to a few percentage
points in the 1940s and 1950s and disappeared completely in the 1960s
and 1970s. Although a portion of wholesale trade involved log and lumber
31 Norton
Ginsburg, Atlas of EconomicDevelopment(Chicago, 1961); Kingsley Davis,
WorldUrbanization,1950-1970, Vol. 1, Basic Data for Cities, Countriesand Regions (Berkeley,
1976); Pamela Barnhouse Walters, "Systemsof Cities and Urban Primacy: Problems of Definition and Measurement," in Urbanization,ed. Timberlake, 63-85.
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brokerage for national markets, the majority represented regional distribution.32 Most federal employment outside the Department of Defense
similarly involves local services such as mail delivery and veterans' assistance or regional resource management through the Forest Service, National Park Service, Bonneville Power Administration, and similar agencies. Despite Seattle's status as a federal regional center, the same proportion of Portlanders and Seattleites worked in such jobs as of 1980.33
The most obvious contrast with Seattle's stable or declining regional
role was the rapid growth of aerospace manufacturing employment as
Boeing captured the dominant share of commercial jetliner production
for national and overseas airlines. After the failure of the Stratocruiser in
the immediate postwar decade, Boeing introduced the highly successful
707 in 1958, following with the 727, the 737, and the 747, which began to
roll off production lines in Everett in 1970. Aircraft manufacturing jobs in
metropolitan Seattle increased steadily from 1949 to 1958. For the next fifteen years, however, Boeing's employment fluctuated widely. Three quick
cycles of boom and bust culminated in the deep "Boeing depression" of
1969-1971, when the corporation's local employment fell from 105,000 to
38,000. In addition, Boeing procured only 10 percent of its processing inputs from the Seattle area during the 1960s, limiting its capacity to stimulate local economic diversification, though shielding the city from multiplier effects of production slowdowns. The major developmental impact of
Boeing, in short, was felt with national rearmament in the early 1950s,
rather than in the booming 1960s.34
Equally important in the long run were additional changes that tied
Seattle into national and international networks. The growth sectors included tourism, higher education, research and development, finance,
and foreign trade. In concert with Boeing's expansion in response to
world markets, a set of public decisions in Seattle between 1955 and 1970
confirmed its participation in a variety of long-distance networks. The
32J. Dennis Lord, "Shifts in the Wholesale Trade Status of U. S. Metropolitan Areas,"
36 (1984): 51-63; Morgan, WestwardTilt, 210. The Seattle:Portland raProfessionalGeographer
tios for wholesale sales were 1.50 in 1930; 1.42 in 1940; 1.05 in 1949; 1.04 in 1958; .90 in 1967;
and .86 in 1977. Data are from FifteenthCensusof the UnitedStates,Distribution,Vol.II: Wholesale
Distribution(Washington, DC); Censusof Business:1939, Vol. II: WholesaleTrade (Washington,
DC); Countyand CityData Books,1952-77; Stateand MetropolitanAreaData Book,1982.
33 U. S. Office of Personnel
Statistics:Reportof
Management, FederalCivilian Workforce
EmploymentbyGeographicArea:December31, 1980 (Washington, DC).
34
Rodney A. Erickson, 'The Regional Impact of Growth Firms: The Case of Boeing,
1963-68," Land Economics50 (May 1974): 127-36; and Rodney A. Erickson, 'The Spatial Pattern of Income Generation in Lead Firm, Growth Area Linkage Systems,"EconomicGeography
51 (January 1975): 17-26; U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, A CaseStudyof
theEffects of theDyna-SoarContractCancellationupon Employeesof the Boeing Companyin Seattle,WashACDA
Publication
No.
29, 1965); Laurence S. Kuter, The GreatGamble:TheBoeing
ington (U.S.
747 (University, AL, 1973).
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remainder of this essay explores these decisions and their results in comparison with Portland.
Although the numbers point to the 1950s as the decade when the fortunes of the two cities began to diverge, direct comparison of their governmental capacity would have offered little encouragement for an ambitious Seattle. Both cities had fiscally conservative "caretaker" governments
that placed greatest emphasis on the smooth delivery of routine services.35
Portland mayors Earl Riley (1941-1948), Fred Peterson (1953-1956), and
maintained close ties with important local
Terry Schrunk (1957-1972)
market businesses. Seattle mayors Arthur Langlie (1938-1942), William
and Gordon Clinton (1956-1964) were even more
Devin (1942-1952),
clearly the picks of the local economic establishment. Reform-minded
mayors who entered office hoping to activate local government-Dorothy
Lee in Portland (1949-1953) and Alan Pomeroy in Seattle (1952-1956)found themselves frozen out of the action by the downtown establishment
and City Hall cronies.36
Both city administrations were also buffered against vigorous central
direction. Individual elected officials and bureaucrats constituted functional fiefdoms within each city government. Under Portland's commission charter, the mayor and each of four independently elected city comSeattle had
missioners managed separate sets of city departments.
achieved the same fragmentation by institutionalizing a system in which
the chairs of city council committees controlled the budgets for specific
functional areas and dominated council discussions with expertise and access to specialized information. The result, as Edward Banfield noted in
Big City Politics, was to force any analysis of Seattle politics to start with the
question: "Anybody in Charge?"37
Despite these formal similarities, Seattle mounted a series of public
initiatives between 1958 and 1968 that Portland was unable to match.
Community efforts assured a successful world's fair, developed convention
and sports facilities, provided essential infrastructure to support a growing
35Oliver P. Williams, "ATypology for Comparative Local Government," MidwestJournal
Political
Science5 (1961): 150- 64; Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, Four Cities:A
of
Studyof ComparativePolicyMaking (Philadelphia, 1963). Caretaker governments contrast with
those that actively pursue economic development, provide a wide range of amenities, or try
to redistribute resources and services among groups and neighborhoods.
36 The results of electoral
politics in Seattle are discussed in Edward C. Banfield, Big
A CompleteGuideto thePoliticalSystemof Atlanta, Boston,Detroit,El Paso, Los Angeles,
Politics:
City
Miami, Philadelphia,St. Louis, Seattle(New York, 1965), 132-45; James Halpin, "Our Musty,
Crusty City Council," SeattleMagazine,May 1965, 12-16, 46-48; and David Brewster, 'The Making of a Mayor, 1969," SeattleMagazine,May 1969, 21-25,47-50. For Portland, see E. Kimbark
MacColl, The Growthof a City:Powerand Politicsin Portland, 1915-1950 (Portland, 1979), 60960, and Paul C. Pitzer, "Dorothy McCullough Lee: The Successes and Failures of 'Dottie-DoGood,'" OregonHistoricalQuarterly91 (Spring 1990): 5-42.
37Banfield, Big CityPolitics,132.
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metropolis, and revitalized the port. The cumulative effect was to move
Seattle into new roles in long range networks of exchange. Over the same
decade, Portland faced similar opportunities and attempted parallel projects but failed to act effectively to promote economic growth.
Contemporary observers commented on the contrasting approaches
to public business. Journalists such as Neil Morgan and Neil Pierce and
scholars such as Earl Pomeroy and DorothyJohansen all perceived different spirits of public and private enterprise. "Unlike Seattle, which is in its
own promotional vocabulary a 'go-ahead' city,"Johansen wrote in 1967,
"Portland moved in 1965 as slowly and deliberately as it did in 1865, and
there remains considerable sentiment... to 'keep things as they are.' "38
These styles of public action expressed distinct valuations of community
entrepreneurship. Each city inclined to a particular way of doing business
by a well-established understanding of acceptable behavior and by institutions that codified those customs and traditions. Assumptions about the
proper way to carry out the public business conditioned specific responses
to scale change in the American economy. Portland was process-centered,
cautious, and localized. Seattle was project-centered, entrepreneurial, and
expansive. While Seattleites built in anticipation of growing business, Portlanders judged facility needs by current demand and by the potential of
purely local and regional markets. In the broadest sweep, Seattle leaders
viewed the expansion of economic scale as an opportunity and measured
their ambitions by Chicago, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. Portlanders
viewed the expansion of economic networks as irrelevant or even threatening to stable commercial relationships.39
Different experiences with major expositions illustrate the contrast.
The two cities began by competing not only for regional and national attention but also for the same date. Led by the Portland Chamber of Commerce, Oregonians decided in December 1954 to commemorate the centennial of statehood with a celebratory exposition in Portland in 1959.
Within a few months, Seattleites began to explore a fifty-yearfollow-up to
the Alaska-Yukon-PacificExposition of 1909. As second in line, Seattle reluctantly ceded 1959 to Portland and shifted its target to 1961 (later
1962) .40
38Johansen and Gates, Empireof the Columbia,564; Earl Pomeroy, ThePacificSlope:A Historyof California, Oregon,Washington,Idaho, Utah, and Nevada (New York, 1965), 139; Neal
Pierce, The Pacific Statesof America(New York, 1972), 215; Morgan, WestwardTilt, 212; Sale,
Seattle,189, 213.
39 Central Association of Seattle, Annual
Report for 1960- 61, Box 10, Dingwall Papers,
University of Washington Manuscript Division, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington (hereafter Dingwall Papers).
40 For
Seattle, see MurrayMorgan, Century21: TheStoryof theSeattleWorld'sFair (Seattle,
1963); John M. Findlay, 'The Off-center Seattle Center: Downtown Seattle and the 1962
World's Fair," Pacific NorthwestQuarterly80 (January 1989): 2-11; Cyrus Noe, "Innocence
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The parallels ended with the timing. The scope of the Seattle exposition grew steadily from a regional reaffirmation of the Alaska connection
to "a means of recapturing prestige ... as the gateway to the Orient" and,
finally, to the global theme of "the wonders of the 'space age' science" and
the future of "Century21," a newly created non-profit branch of the Washington State fair commission that managed the fair.41The fair's advocates
recruited strong business leadership and political backing in Olympia and
used Century 21 to insulate their operations from local politics. The promoters tapped the city for $15 million in site and building improvements,
secured $7.5 million from the State of Washington, and obtained $9 million for federal participation. The federal commitment forced postponement to 1962, but it enabled fair chairmanJoseph Gandy to argue successfully for designation as a world's fair by the Bureau of International Expositions.42 Official sanction also allowed the planners to attract international exhibits and to draw on the best national expertise, ranging from
the Walt Disney organization to an advisory board representing the National Science Foundation, National Academy of Sciences, and American
Association for the Advancement of Science. Reams of favorable publicity
and 9,600,000 paid visits made it arguably the most successful of all postwar American world's fairs. The renovated site and buildings, about a mile
north of downtown, became Seattle Center, with a science museum, renovated auditorium, and major convention facilities. Just as importantly, the
fair symbolized Seattle's arrival as a national city and taught outsiders that
the Northwest's metropolis started with an "S".43

Portland had preempted 1959 but lost its chance to upstage Seattle

16 (April1982):24-32;and substanRevisited:TwentyYearsafter the Fair,"PacificNorthwest
tialmaterialsin the DingwallPapersand theJoseph GandyPapers,Universityof Washington
ManuscriptsDepartment,Universityof Washington,Seattle,Washington(hereafterGandy
Papers).The storyof the OregonCentennialExpositionmustbe pieced togetherfrom newspaperaccountsand from the OregonCentennialCommissionPapers,OregonHistoricalSociety, Portland,Oregon (hereafterCommissionPapers),the Ted HallockPapers,Oregon
HistoricalSociety,Portland,Oregon (hereafterHallockPapers),and the AnthonyBrandenthaler Papers,Oregon HistoricalSociety,Portland,Oregon (hereafterBrandenthalerPapers).
41Minutesof Boardof Trustees,WorldFairCorporation,28Januaryand 22July 1958,
Box 14, Dingwall Papers; Design Standards Advisory Board, "PreliminarySite Plan Report,"
1958, Box 13, Dingwall Papers.
42Transcript of interview of Ewen Dingwall byJohn Findlay, 19 August 1985, Dingwall
Papers (hereafter Dingwall interview); "Historical Features" file, Box 1, Gandy Papers; Minutes of Board of Trustees, World's Fair Corporation, 27 March 1958 and 30 October 1959,
Box 14, Dingwall Papers.
43
"Report of the Century 21 Commission, State of Washington, 1961," Box 13, Dingwall Papers; and Dingwall interview. For typical discussions of the fair as a boost for Seattle,
see Russell Lynes, "Seattle Will Never be the Same," Harpers,July 1962, 20-25; and Charles N.
Stabler, "Seattle World's Fair Likely to be First One in 30 Years to Profit," Wall StreetJournal
(New York), 13July 1962.
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by planning the Oregon Centennial Exposition on the cheap. While Seattle steadily broadened the scope and appeal of its effort, Portland whittled
its vision to the comfortable model of local "pioneer days." Despite early
national publicity and a small international trade fair, the celebration had
little to attract Portlanders, let alone visitors from out of state. Planned initially to utilize a new Portland coliseum and convention center, the exposition had to turn to the Oregon legislature when the Portland facility
bogged down in the city's neighborhood politics. The parsimonious state
doled out $2.6 million in two grudging installments in 1958 and 1959,
barely in time to remodel a livestock exhibition hall into display space.
Downstate jealousies were manifested in a penny-pinching Oregon Centennial Commission that determined to show an operating profit, and diverted effort to ancillary events around the state. Political conflicts between the state commission and newly elected Governor Mark Hatfield
hobbled local managers in the last months of preparation.44 Portlanders
themselves quickly learned to stay away from what turned out to be little
more than an interminable county fair without the plum preserves and Future Farmers. The 900,000 paid admissions embarrassed civic leaders who
had hoped for 5-7 million visitors. The event left a slightly improved facility for the privately operated Pacific International Livestock Exposition
rather than any equivalent of Seattle Center.45
A delay in the construction of a coliseum and convention center
handicapped the centennial exposition. As early as 1954, a mayor's advisory committee had recommended a Columbia River site for an exposition-arena campus that could accommodate the Pacific International
stock show, as well as other events. In May 1954, Portland voters approved
a charter amendment that created an Exposition-Recreation Commission
and authorized an $8 million bond issue. The assurance of funding
brought the city's sectional conflicts into the open. Reports from the Planning Commission and Stanford Research Institute argued for a centrally
located alternative. The leading site, in the view of downtown investors,
was an under-utilized area south of the downtown-land that would later
be incorporated into Portland's first urban renewal project. In October
1955, the Exposition-Recreation Commission voted three to two for the
44 Stanford Research Institute,
Study of the Economic Feasibility and Preliminary Planning Requirements for the Proposed Oregon Centennial Celebration, June 1955, Box 1, Accession Group 1603-1, Commission Papers; Final Report of Oregon Centennial Commission
(draft, 1960), Box 2, Accession Group 1603, Commission Papers; Ted Hallock toJohn Simpson, 27 July 1959, Hallock Papers; transcript of KATU-TV news report by Tom McCall on
Mark Hatfield's questions about Centennial Commission spending, Brandenthaler Papers;
Lillie Sweetland (Centennial Commissioner) to the editor, Oregonian(Portland), 13 August
1958; OregonJournal (Portland), 13 March and 4 April 1957; Oregonian(Portland), 5 October
and 23 December 1958.
45 Oregonian(Portland), 24July and 5 August 1959; Final Report, Commission
Papers.
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Columbia River location. The city council then refused, by one vote, to
make available the necessary city land. The stalemate was broken by a successful initiative measure that restricted any coliseum to the east side of
the Willamette River (an area that included the Columbia River shoreline). The city finally compromised with a location on the east bank of the
Willamette River within view of downtown. The openness of the deliberations and Oregon's easy use of the voter-initiated referendum allowed different economic interests to derail the project in sequence. When finally
built, the new coliseum was too small to compete for large national conventions; and, ironically, voters rejected expansion in 1962 as too risky.46
The differing fates of proposals for covered sports stadiums also revealed contrasting approaches to growth. Portland's proposed "Delta
Dome" (named for its site in Delta Park near the Centennial Exposition
grounds) would have been the nation's second covered multipurpose stadium. Despite strong backing from Mayor Terry Schrunk and other politicians, from newspapers, and from utility companies, Multnomah County
bonds proposals for a Delta Dome failed in both May and November 1964,
with substantial opposition

in every part of the county.47 In addition to

their concerns about site access, many voters were unwilling to risk national competition by building a stadium without a previous commitment
from a major league baseball franchise.48
Defeat at the polls opened the doors for city and suburban politicians
to float competing proposals for a new site near the Columbia River, for
suburban locations, and for expansion of existing facilities. Advocates of
each scheme for new construction were able to veto the competition without being able to develop a coalition around their own proposal.49Under
heavy pressure from downtown hotels and retailers, the City of Portland
46
Progress Notes on the Exposition-Recreation Center, 23July 1956, Ormond Bean Papers, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon; statements on Exposition-Recreation
Center by James Richardson, October 1955, and William Bowes, 25 October 1955, and report of Exposition-Recreation Commission to Mayor Terry Schrunk, 3July 1957, all in Box 1,
William Bowes Papers, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon; "Report on ExpositionRecreation Bonds, New Series," PortlandCityClubBulletin43 (2 November 1962).
47 "Report on Authorizing County Bonds to Construct a Covered Stadium," Portland
CityClubBulletin45 (23 October 1964); "Report on Multnomah Stadium Acquisition Bonds,"
PortlandCityClubBulletin47 (21 October 1966); Terry Schrunk to R. W. DeWeese, 31 August
1964, Box 1, Terry Schrunk Papers, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon (hereafter
Schrunk Papers); OregonJournal(Portland), 14 November 1964.
48
"Report... September-November 1964," opposition statement by Citizens Against
Delta Dome, and "General Summary of Data Analysis on Delta Dome Election, November
1964," in Volunteers for Delta Dome Covered Stadium Papers, Oregon Historical Society,
Portland, Oregon.
49 "Portlanders Confused on Stadium," Oregonian(Portland), 27 February 1966. Also,
Oregonian(Portland), 8 January and 11 February 1966; and OregonJournal (Portland), 10
February 1966.
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purchased an inadequate 28,000-seat stadium located on the downtown
fringe from private owners in 1966. By committing Portland to an interim
measure, the action killed hope of a new, nationally competitive facility. It
also expressed a deep unwillingness to speculate on the long-term expansion of professional sports. The city maintained a venue for Triple-A baseball and high school football playoffs, but dropped off the list for major
league baseball or football.50
Seattle started the 1960s with similar problems. Efforts to court the
Cleveland Indians in 1964 foundered on inadequate facilities and lack of
enthusiasm at City Hall.51The commercial-civic elite incorporated a major
stadium in the massive 1968 bond issue that voters approved under the
rubric Forward Thrust. Use of a state-appointed Washington Stadium
Commission to evaluate locations in the suburbs, near Seattle Center, and
south of downtown, deliberately took the decision on site out of open politics. The appointment ofJoe Gandy, the former president of the Century
21 corporation, kept the civic elite in control of the process. A glance at
Gandy's incoming correspondence shows the intense advocacy for competing sites that might have derailed a more open process (as had happened in Portland).52Indeed, the initial Stadium Commission choice near
Seattle Center was defeated by referendum in 1970, bringing reactivation
of the commission, another detour around open politics, and a new site
on the southern edge of the central business district. The resulting Kingdome gets few points for design excellence, but its availability for American League and National Football League teams confirmed Seattle's public standing as a "majorleague" city.
Underlining the different success in project planning and implementation was a contrasting willingness to pay for basic infrastructure. After
meeting immediate postwar needs, voters in both cities were reluctant to
spend money on anything but bare maintenance of public facilities. From
1952 through 1962, Portlanders said yes to eight tax base, tax levy, and
bond measures proposed by the city, county, and school district and no to
twenty. Seattle's voters accepted only three bond issues and rejected eight
between 1952 and 1958.53 In the latter year, however, Seattle and King
County residents took the bold step of creating the Municipality of
50John Haviland to Terry Schrunk, 27 April 1966; Ford Montgomery to Terry Schrunk,
26 April 1966; and Building Owners and Managers Association to Terry Schrunk, 2 June
1966; all in Box 4, Schrunk Papers.
51
Sam Angeloff, "AreWe Ready for the Big Leagues," SeattleMagazine,January 1964,
10-16.
52 For
examples, see Bellevue Chamber of Commerce to James R. Ellis et al., 18 June
1968; and Brewster Denny to Joseph Gandy, 20June 1968; both in Box 18, Gandy Papers.
53 Portland
voting record compiled from newspaper reports on elections; Seattle information from Banfield, Big CityPolitics,144.
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Metropolitan Seattle to build the sewers and treatment plants necessary to
preserve the attractions of Lake Washington. Although Seattle and King
County voters turned down a multipurpose regional agency in March, they
agreed in September to spend $125 million on the single problem of water
quality.54 Ten years later, business and political leadership coordinated Forward Thrust, an ad hoc process to develop a prioritized list of metro area
capital needs. Forward Thrust was developed outside the structures of local
government explicitly to force the support of local rival politicians. As attorneyJames Ellis commented during the Forward Thrust campaign, "some of
us have just gotten sick and tired of trying to change the structure of local
government. I tried myself for fifteen years, and I'm damned if I'm going to
wait another fifteen before anything actually gets done." Again, Seattle and
King County responded by approving $324 million for highways, sewers,
neighborhood improvements, fire protection, parks, and recreation.55
Portland was not so much cheap as it was slow in pursuing new port
investment. Through the 1950s, Portland outpaced Seattle in general
cargo movements and the bulk shipments of farm and forest products that
traditionally constituted most of the trade over northwest docks.56 Portlanders supported new maritime facilities by voting $6.5 million for the
city's Commission of Public Docks in 1954 and $9.5 million in 1960. However, the 1960 figure covered less than half of the needs list prepared by
consultants.57 Lacking the stable funding of a dedicated tax base and with
no comprehensive plan in place, the Docks Commission waited three cautious years before it began to spend the money. Since the established operators in the Columbia River trade who dominated the Docks Commission agreed with outside consultants that the new technology of containerization was inappropriate for traditional regional bulk commodities, the
funds finally went to improve familiar general cargo docks.58
54 Roscoe C. Martin,
Metropolisin Transition:Local GovernmentAdaptation to Changing
UrbanNeeds (Washington, 1963), 75-88; Mylon Winn, A Modelof OrganizationalDevelopment:A
Case Study of the Municipality of MetropolitanSeattle (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington,
Report,1959-79 (Seattle, 1979).
1982); and Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, Twenty-Year
55Ellis
quoted in Patrick Douglas, "Politics:Forward Thrust," SeattleMagazine,January
Plan for a County,4
1968, 29-32. Also see Forward Thrust, Inc., Developinga CapitalImprovement
vols. (Seattle, 1967).
56
Stanley H. Brewer, The CompetitivePosition of Seattleand Puget Sound Ports in World
Trade,University of Washington College of Business Administration, Management Series No.
7 (Seattle, 1963); and Padraic Burke, A Historyof thePort of Seattle(Seattle, 1976), 106, 110-11.
57Oregonian(Portland), 20June 1960; "Report on Dock Development Bonds," Portland
CityClubBulletin41 (28 October 1960).
58 Author's interview with Raymond Kell, Docks Commissioner and Port Commissioner, 11 June 1990, transcript in possession of author (hereafter Kell interview); Minutes of
meeting of Metropolitan Planning Commission with Port of Portland and Commission of
Public Docks, 20 August 1965, Box 2, David Eccles Papers, Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

1992

CARLABBOTT

313

The careful preservation of split decision-making further hampered
effective port development. The city-appointed Docks Commission and
the state-appointed Port of Portland divided responsibilities until they
merged in 1970. The former maintained public marine terminals and
built new ones, when it could pull together the money. Originally created
to dredge the Willamette River channel, the latter agency added industrial
development and operation of the regional airport. The Docks Commission saw itself as a scrappy agency that spoke for the ship captains and
barge owners who knew the rivers. The Port of Portland represented the
more Olympian views of bankers, clubmen, and inheritors of old wealth
whose eyes were alert to real estate deals. Given the poor record of cooperation, the divided control of port development institutionalized caution
through multiple veto points.59
Simultaneously, Seattle turned to facilities for containerized cargo
out of a sense of necessity. A series of consultant studies and a KING-TV
documentary on "Lost Cargo" articulated a growing crisis of confidence
in Port of Seattle management in 1959, setting off several years of bureaucratic infighting and contests for the elected seats on the Port Commission. Firmly in place by 1963, a new growth-oriented majority spent
more than $100 million to modernize and upgrade marine terminals
and industrial land as a way to bypass Portland's historic advantage, and
to compete directly with Oakland. The Port Commission gambled on
the development of long range business in which containerized cargoes
would move through Seattle in transit between Asia and the ports on the
Atlantic. A reactivated Mayor's Maritime Advisory Committee after 1963
promoted port-based economic development and lobbied state and federal officials. The rhetoric of the revitalized port reflected its new energy, "catapulting" to "record-breaking performance" by the mid-1960s
and "barreling full bore" in its "relentless escalation" toward full success.60

The results of the Portland and Seattle approaches were apparent in
import-export data. The relative value of both import and export trade
shifted to the advantage of Seattle between 1967 and 1977 (see Table 5).
Portland retained its historic western role as an exporter of high bulk, low
value commodities such as minerals, wood products, and farm products
59
"Report on Port Management, Operation and Development in the Metropolitan
Portland and Columbia River Area," Portland City ClubBulletin 45 (26 April 1965); and Kell
interview.
60Burke, Port of Seattle,110-26; 'The Maritime Industry's
Magic Box," SeattleMagazine,
May 1969, 52-55; Gordon Clinton to W. R. Norwood, 10January 1963, in "Mayor'sMaritime
Advisory Committee" file, Box 27, Accession Group 239-2, Seattle Mayor's Papers, University
of Washington Manuscripts Department, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington
(hereafter Mayor's Papers); Reporter(Port of Seattle), 1 February 1967, in "Port Committee"
file, Box 52, Mayor's Papers.
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while gaining selected high tonnage imports such as automobiles. Seattle
developed as a comprehensive international port that shipped and received extensively-processed high-value goods. A key step came in 1970,
when the development of new container terminals convinced a consortium of six Japanese shipping lines to make Seattle their first port of call
on the West Coast. In 1967, Seattle exports carried an average value of
$.05 per pound compared with $.04 for Portland. The comparable figures
for 1986 were $.36 for Seattle and $.08 for Portland.61
Seattle also emerged as the Northwest's air-travelhub. Into the 1950s,
the two cities had equal rail access to the East, while Portland enjoyed
greater proximity to California. Both cities produced equal numbers of air
passengers per thousand residents.62 When American carriers adopted
passenger jets during the 1960s, however, Seattle gained a majority of direct long-distance flights. Airport expansion, starting in 1969, and aggressive competition for new route designations allowed Seattle to double
Portland's air passenger miles and passengers per day by the early 1980s.
Present-day Seattle can virtually match Portland's time-distance to California and offers superior access outside the West.63

One reason for Seattle's greater willingness to pursue extra-regional
opportunities lies in the timing of generational transition. The expansion
of Boeing with Korean War orders, Cold War contracts, and the 707 passenger jet required the recruitment of thousands of engineers and managers from beyond the Northwest.64Expansion of the University of Washington multiplied this "Boeing effect." After divisive internal battles over
political loyalty oaths during the early 1950s, the university hired a new
president with a new agenda in 1958. Enrollment had edged up from
12,271 in 1940 to 13,675 in 1956 and then exploded to 29,977 by 1968.
President Charles Odegaard encouraged faculty to tap the rapidly grow61
Averages calculated from total tonnages and total value of shipments reported in the
Exportsand GeneralImmonthly volumes of U. S. Department of Commerce, U. S. Waterborne
ports (Washington, DC).
62 1951
figures in EdwardJ. Taaffe, "AirTransport and United States Urban DistribuReview46 (April 1956): 219-38.
tion," Geographical
63 The
Official Airline Guide indicates that Seattle in the 1970s and 1980s offered
roughly 50 percent more direct and through flights to the east coast than did Portland. Passenger volumes are from John Tepper Marlin and James S. Avery, The Bookof AmericanCity
Rankings (New York, 1983). Lobbying efforts are discussed in SeattleBusiness, 5 April 1966.
Expansion of Seattle-Tacoma International Airport is treated in Burke, Port of Seattle,124.
Major planned expansion of Portland International Airport in the early 1970s was stopped by
analysis of its negative environmental impacts.
64In both 1960 and 1970, metropolitan Seattle had three and a half times as many employed engineers and technical workers as metropolitan Portland. EighteenthCensus of the
United States, Vol. 1: Characteristicsof the Population, Pt. 39, Table 74, and Pt. 49, Table 74
of thePopulation,
(Washington, DC); NineteenthCensusof the UnitedStates,Vol. 1: Characteristics
Pt. 39, Table 86, and Pt. 49, Table 86 (Washington, DC).
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ing pool of federal research funds in medicine and the sciences.65A growing university helped to attract a Battelle Institute think tank in 1965. By
1977, Seattle occupied eighth place among all metropolitan areas in receipt of federal research and development dollars to universities and sixth
place for total federal research and development funds. The university itself had changed from a regional educator to a national information producer.66

As utility executive Thomas Bolger pointed out during the Forward
Thrust campaign, the growth of Boeing, the University of Washington,
and business and university related activities made Seattle "a net importer
of people and talent."67Politically active citizens now included college educated professionals and managers with experience and connections outside Seattle. In contrast, statewide institutional and community jealousies
retarded the evolution of Portland State College into a major university.
Portland lacked the economic multiplier from a large body of out-of-town
students and from faculty research grants. It also lacked Seattle's dense
network of connections within national educational and research systems.
Something comparable to the impact of Boeing did not appear in Portland's stable industrial structure until the rapid growth of the electronics
industry in the 1970s.68The results can be read from census data on the
proportion of adults twenty-fiveyears or older with four or more years of
college. In 1950, Portland's 7.5 percent lagged behind Seattle's 9.7 percent. The gap had widened by 1970, with 12.8 percent of Portlanders and
15.9 percent of Seattleites holding college degrees.69
Patterns of internal migration also show the importance of newcomers for setting Seattle's civic tone. Census reports include data on migration among state economic areas from 1955 to 1960 and from 1965 to
65 Enrollment data
from American Council on Education, AmericanCollegesand Universities,4th through 13th editions, covering 1940 to 1986 at irregular intervals. Also Charles M.
Gates, TheFirstCenturyat the Universityof Washington,1861-1961 (Seattle, 1961), 216-19;Jane
Sanders, Into the SecondCentury:The Universityof Washington,1961-1986 (Seattle, 1987); and
Sale, Seattle,208-10.
66Edward Malecki, "Federal R & D Spending in the United States of America: Some
Impacts on Metropolitan Economies," Regional Studies 16 (1982), 19-35. Argus (Seattle), 9
July 1965, reported that federal grants at the University of Washington nearly matched state
general fund support by 1964.
67 Thomas
Bolger, 'The Forward Thrust Story," speech to Vancouver Rotary Club, 4
June 1968, in Developinga CapitalImprovement
Plan, Vol. 4: SelectedSpeecheson ForwardThrust,
82 by Forward Thrust, Inc.
68Gordon B. Dodds and
Craig E. Wollner with the assistance of Marshall M. Lee, The
SiliconForest:High Techin thePortlandArea, 1945 to 1986 (Portland, 1990).
69
SeventeenthCensus of the United States, Vol. 2: Characteristicsof the Population, Pt. 37,
Table 34, and Pt. 47, Table 34 (Washington, DC); EighteenthCensusof the UnitedStates,Vol. 1:
Characteristics
of thePopulation,Pt. 39, Table 73, and Pt. 49, Table 73 (Washington, DC); and
NineteenthCensusof the UnitedStates,Vol.I: Characteristics
of thePopulation,Pt. 39, Table 83, and
Pt. 49, Table 83 (Washington, DC).
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1970 (see Table 6). During both periods, Seattle drew a higher proportion
of its residents from beyond the Pacific states and greater Northwest
(Nevada, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, and the Dakotas). In 1960,
roughly 54,000 King County residents had arrived from the more distant
parts of the United States since 1955, but only 25,000 new residents of
metropolitan Portland. For 1970, the parallel figures were 68,000 and
30,000. The contrasting totals reflect the greater need and ability of Seattle enterprises to tap national labor markets and the city's greater attraction for footloose migrants. In turn, the newcomers found both a guidebook and a voice in Seattle Magazine (1964-1971), whose articles and
columns exposed local issues, profiled politicians and businessmen, reviewed neighborhoods, and introduced new Seattleites to their city.70A
growing and changing community supported a spirit of civic optimism in
Seattle in the 1960s. The weekly Argus mounted a vigorous campaign to
energize city politics. The venerable Municipal League changed from the
conservative voice of what the Argus called the "mature oligarchy" to a
more active advocate of government reform.71Metro's visible success with
Lake Washington and the underpinning of prosperity during the 1960s
created a window of opportunity for civic action. Community activist
James Ellis later recalled the origins of Forward Thrust:
The business leadershiphad been so successfulwith the World'sFair, the
civic leadershiphad been successfulwith Metro in cleaning up LakeWashington, and both of those big initiatives,which were citizen-led,had had
tremendouslyeffectivepublic officialparticipation.... The public generally
had the view then that there was almost nothing that this community
couldn't tackleand win. It wasa veryupbeat time in this area, and I've lived
here all my life, and I don't knowof anyother timeswhen I've seen so much
optimismgenerallysharedby the public.72
If generational change and community confidence help to explain
the greater responsiveness of Seattle voters to civic initiatives, historical
continuities seem more relevant to different attitudes in club rooms and
board rooms. Portland in the 1960s confirms Daniel Elazar's characterization of Oregon as a state of moralistic politics. Government was seen as an
enforcer of rules and barrier against impetuous action. Reasoning by analogy from the realm of individual ethics, conservative Portland tended to
regard public debt as a flaw of civic character. At best, Portland's moralistic politics have prompted open decision-making and public processes
70Sale, Seattle,212-15.
71
Argus (Seattle), 19 September 1958, 12 May 1961, 10 April 1964, and 7 August 1964.
72 Transcript of interview of James Ellis by Lorraine McConaghy, 13 October 1988,
Seattle Parks Department, 1-2, transcript in possession of author. Also see Mechlin D. Moore,
speech to Central Seattle Association, 10 May 1966, in "Central Association of Seattle" file,
Box 38, Mayor's Papers.
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that have ensured careful planning.73 At its least effective, the same emphasis on process has meant a distrust of active government and a willingness to accept multiple vetoes by popular referendum, legislative inaction,
and conflicting economic interests.74
Seattle's contrasting tradition of individualistic politics treated active
government as an instrument for creating economic value. The Seattle system was open to self-interest and corruption, as with labor-management
collusion in the 1940s.75It was also amenable to the definition and pursuit
of a positive common good. Seattleites in the 1960s accepted ad hoc decision-making in the interest of accomplishing their development agenda.
The city's project orientation allowed its commercial-civic leadership to
detour around the potential delays and vetoes of the formal political process. In a sense, Seattle leaders accepted a set of operating rules that
looked back to the Alaska myth as legitimation of active community entrepreneurship.76
By the time Portland felt the equivalent of Seattle's civic energy in
the 1970s, Seattle's evolution into a network city had a ten- or twelve-year
lead.77Historical analysis confirms and provides a context for recent studies that emphasize Seattle's extra-regional ties in specific industrial sectors such as manufacturing and services.78The results can be summed up
as the contrast between a "Northwest city" and a "Pacific city."As it did a
century ago, Portland still functions as a gateway for regional commerce
and as a service center for portions of three states. Seattle increasingly
participates in the long-range networks of finance, investment, tourism,
and trade that link the North American and East Asian core regions of
the world economy. It outranks Portland not only in the volume and
73 DanielJ. Elazar, AmericanFederalism:
A ViewFromtheStates(New York, 1972); Carl Abbott, "Urban Design in Portland, Oregon, as Policy and Process, 1960-1989," Planning Perspectives6 (Winter 1991): 1-18 examines the positive effects of the process orientation.
74E. Kimbark MacColl, "Portland: First Class on a Steerage Ticket," The New
Pacific 1
(Summer 1990): 41-49 explores Portland's ingrained conservatism. Portland attorney and
political insider Raymond Kell contrasted the strong anti-tax sentiment in Portland with
Seattle's willingness to "mortgage everything they had" to pursue economic development,
Kell interview.
75Green, AmericanCities,189-92.
76The same contrast between
process and project orientations continued to characterize downtown development planning in the 1970s and 1980s. See Mark R. Bello, "Urban
Regimes and Downtown Planning in Portland, Oregon, and Seattle, Washington, 1974-1990"
(Ph.D. diss. in progress, Portland State University). Seattleites reminded themselves of the
city's go-getter heritage by purchasing thousands of copies of William C. Speidel, Sons of the
Profits,or There'sNo BusinessLike GrowBusiness:TheSeattleStory,1851-1901 (Seattle, 1967).
77Abbott, Portland,167-277.
78William B. Beyers, "On Geographical Properties of Growth Center Linkage Systems,"
EconomicGeography50 (July 1974): 203-18; William Beyers, "Export Services in Postindustrial
in AdSociety," Papersof theRegionalScienceAssociation57 (1985): 33-48; and Pred, City-Systems
vancedEconomies.
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value of overseas trade, but also in the number of direct overseas flights,
number of foreign bank offices, amount of foreign investment, number
of professional consular officers, and proportion of foreign born residents.79
Examination of urban growth in the Pacific Northwest confirms that
urban rivalry remains a fruitful topic for historians interested in twentiethcentury cities. A number of historians, most prominently Roger Lotchin,
have explored the definition of network-oriented growth strategies as city
boosters have looked to federal spending or international trade. This essay
offers a framework for measuring the relative importance of such transregional connections. The dual system model may be applicable to the changing fortunes of cities in other parts of North America. Pairs of cities that may
be comparable to Portland and Seattle include Birmingham and Atlanta,
Cincinnati and Columbus, Cleveland and Pittsburgh, or San Antonio and
Dallas. Across the northern border, the rise of Toronto relative to Montreal
is similarly attributed to the shifting location of network activities.80
Attention to the role of network factors in urban rivalries suggests a
way to structure the historical analysis of local responses to the changing
scale of activity and the changing range of opportunities in the national
and international economies.81 Many specialists now recognize "world
cities" as a distinct type of metropolis that absorbs a disproportionate
share of economic and political control functions. The world city or global
city is a specialized producer of financial and business services and a
resources of public information, priwholesaler of the nonregionalized
Most
and
vate intelligence,
writers, however, are content to incapital.82
of world cities while ignoring the
and
character
the
distribution
ventory
79Banker,March 1988, 37-61; 'JapaneseInvestorsPrefer California,"Chronicle
(San
in U. S.
Investment
Francisco),28 December 1989;and K Leventhaland Co., 1988Japanese
RealEstate(LosAngeles,1989).
80 Diana Hooper,J. W. Simmons,and L. S. Bourne, TheChanging
Basisof
Economic
CanadianUrbanGrowth,
1971-1981,Centerfor Urbanand CommunityStudies,Toronto,ResearchPaper139, 1983.
81 In
waysdifferentfrom this essay,tworecentbookshavetakenon the questionof citylevel responsesto the changingscale of the nationaleconomy.Don H. Doyle, in NewMen,
New Cities,New South:Atlanta,Nashville,Charleston,
Mobile,1860- 1910 (Chapel Hill, NC,
1990), examines the successesand failuresof the urban businessclass of the postbellum
South in implementingthe "NewSouth"goals of integrationinto the national industrial
Decline:Business,Politics,
economy.The focus of John T. Cumbler,A SocialHistoryofEconomic
andWorkin Trenton(NewBrunswick,NJ, 1989) is the characterof local responsesto the shift
coror "bureaucratic
fromlocallybased"civiccapitalism"to largerscale "nationalcapitalism"
poratism."His model of the impactsof scale change on local decisionsand decision-makers
drawson RobertMerton'sdistinctionbetweenlocal and cosmopolitanleadershipin Robert
andSocialStructure
K Merton,SocialTheory
(Glencoe,IL, 1957).
82PeterHall, TheWorldCities(NewYork,1966);R. B. Cohen, "TheNew International
and
Divisionof Labor,MultinationalCorporations,and Urban Hierarchy,"in Urbanization
UrbanPlanningin CapitalistSociety,ed. MichaelDear and AllanJ. Scott (New York,1981);
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question of origins. They are much better at detailing what such cities do
and what they are like than at explaining why Hong Kong is on everybody's list but Panama City is not. For one nation, at least, attention to the
changing balance of regional, national network, and international network functions over several decades may be an appropriate avenue for exploring the way in which the United States has structured its developing
participation in the world urban system.

John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff, "World City Formation: An agenda for research and action," InternationalJournalof Urbanand RegionalResearch6 (September 1982): 30944; John
Friedmann, "The World City Hypothesis," Growthand Change17 (1986): 69-83; and Mattei
Dogan and John D. Kasarda, eds., TheMetropolisEra: A Worldof Giant Cities,Vol. 1 (Newbury
Park, CA, 1988).
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TABLE1
SEATTLEAND PORTLANDPOPULATION

1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940

1950
1960

1970
1980a
1990a
1980b
1990b
1880-1910:
1920-1940:
1950-1990a:
1980b-1990b:

Seattle

Portland

3,553
42,837
80,871
237,174
357,950
420,663
452,639
844,572
1,107,213
1,421,869
1,607,469
1,972,961
2,093,000
2,559,164

17,577
46,385
90,426
207,214
299,882
378,728
406,406
704,829
821,897
1,009,129
1,242,594
1,412,344
1,298,000
1,477,895

Seattle:Portand
.92
.89
1.14
1.19
1.11
1.11
1.20
1.35

1.41
1.29
1.40

1.61
1.73

Cities
Metropolitan districts
Populations within 1960 SMSAboundaries
Standard Consolidated Metropolitan Areas

TABLE2
RELATIVEPOPULATIONAND PERSONALINCOME:
RATIOS OF SEATTLEAND PORTLAND HINTERLANDS

Income

Population
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980

(1)
1.44
1.73
1.71
1.57
1.48

(2)
1.58
1.94
1.97
1.80

1.43

1.58
1.60
1.56
1.49

1.50
1.50

1.41

1.63

(3)

(4)

1.62
1.56
1.49
1.58
1.62
1.54

1.82
1.76
1.66
1.64
1.67
1.61

(1): Population in OR and WA weighted 1, population in AK, ID and MT weighted 0.5
(2): Same as (1), less Seattle and Portland city populations (1900-10), metropolitan district populations (1920-40), or populations within 1960 SMSA boundaries (1950-80)
(3): Personal income in OR and WA weighted 1, personal income in AK, ID, and MT weighted 0.5
[WA per capita income used for AK for 1930 and 1940]
(4): Same as (3), less Seattle and Portland city populations (1900-10), metropolitan district populations (1920-40), or populations within 1960 SMSA boundaries (1950-80)
For hinterland definitions, see Note 26.
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TABLE3
EMPLOYMENTIN REGIONALLY-BASED
MANUFACTURING
Regionally-Based Manufacturing
as Percent of all Employment

Seattle

Seattle:
Portland

Portland

1909
1919

4.7
4.8

5.7
6.2

.82
.69

1930

3.1

4.7

.66

1940
1950
1960
1970
1980

9.0
6.8
6.9
4.8
3.6

13.0
12.4
11.5
7.9
6.2

.69
.55
.60
.61
.58

See Note 27 for definition of category and sources. The figures for 1909-19, for
1930, and for 1940-80 were derived from data compiled according to different
principles.

TABLE4
SEATrLE AND PORTLANDAS PRIMATECITIES

Ginsburg Index
Seattle
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980

.44
.51
.55
.57
.58
.58
.63
.65
.75

Portland
.81
.83
.85
.85
.84
.86
.82
.76
.73

Ginsburg Index = population of largest city in region divided by total population of four largest
cities in region
Seattle and Portland regions defined as in Table 2 (see Note 26)
Metropolitan district populations used when designated for 1920-40; metropolitan area populations forl950-70; consolidated metropolitan area populations for 1980.
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TABLE5
SEATTLE-EVERETTAND PORTLAND-VANCOUVERWATERBORNE
FOREIGN TRADE ($1 MILLIONS)

Imports

Exports
S:P

Seattle

Portland

S:P

$205

1.18

1655

$173
350

3966

1159

Seattle

Portland

1967

$203

$385

1972
1977

348

388

.90

883

765

1.15

1982

2759

1.35

10,251

2167

1986

4194

2048
1873

3.42
4.86

2.24

19,084

3940

4.84

.53

4.73

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U. S. Waterborne Exports and
General Imports

TABLE6
ORIGINS OF DOMESTIC IMMIGRANTSTO SEATTLEAND PORTLAND,

1955-60 AND 1965-70
Oregon and
Washington

Other Pacific or
Northwest States

Other
U.S.

Seattle SEA
(163,916 total)

46 %

21 %

33 %

Portland SEA
(105,237 total)

50 %

26 %

24 %

Seattle SEA
(218,935 total)

36 %

33 %

31 %

Portland SEA
(137,044 total)

44 %

34 %

22 %

1955-60

1965-70

Seattle State Economic Area: King County
Portland State Economic Area: Multnomah, Washington,
and Clackamas counties
Sources: U.S. Census of Population, 1960, Subject Report PC (2E):
Migration Between State Economic Areas
U.S. Census of Population, 1970, Subject Report PC(2)-2E:
Migration Between State Economic Areas

